I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Fleming, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals spoke for many federal courts when it observed that "U] udges are not wardens, but we must act as wardens to the limited extent that unconstitutional prison conditions force us to intervene when those responsible for the conditions have failed to act."' This admission is revealing of judicial perception and motive: rather than characterizing its actions as discretionary, the court asserted that it had no choice but to join the fray.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 5 partly in response to the judicial philosophy expressed in Harris. Rather than defining judicial intervention as a "force [d] " response to neglectful prison staff, congressional the PLRA represents the assertion of majoritarian supremacy over constitutional courts accused of exceeding their legitimate, limited authority.' 9 The Article proceeds in the following manner. The following section describes the collision between two models, one directed at prison reform and the other dominating constitutional law. From the majoritarian perspective, prison reform judges fell victim to "Lochnerization:, 20 they engaged in judicial policy making in the name of adjudication. By enacting the PLRA, Congress sought to forbid judicial overreaching. The Article next questions whether inmates can secure adequate constitutional protection from abusive penal practices. *The answer reveals that prisoners' rights advocates are cornered: the PLRA limits the remedial powers of federal courts; 2 1 and, in deference to majoritarian supremacy, the judiciary has rejected challenges to its constitutionality.
22
I conclude by positing a 'justice gap" between underlying constitutional norms and the case law providing for a piecemeal prisoners' bill of rights. This Article shows that the cornerstone of prisoners' rights-the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 2 S -embodies underenforced constitutional norms. Moreover, its content reveals an inclusiveness sadly absent from the majoritarian paradigm of constitutional law.
the Court is "never for long out of line with ... lawmaking majorities"). On the other hand, the elected branches often do not mirror the will of the majority. See, e.g., Alan D. Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980 -1993 , 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 6, 15-16 (1998 (finding that congressional action and public opinion achieved concurrence fifty-five percent of the time between [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . 9 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (describing the principal propositions of majoritarian supremacy).
2' The term "Lochnerization" is derived from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) , and denotes a priori reasoning. In Lochner, the Supreme Court found "a general right ... to contract." Id. at 58. Lochner's offspring read laissez faire values into the Constitution. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (rul- ing that minimum wage laws violated due process); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1915) (striking down legislation prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts); see also text accompanying infra note 35 (describing the "Lochner era"). 21 See supra notes 11, 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA's provisions addressing damages and prospective relief). ' See infra note 57 (citing cases). " U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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II. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN

DIFFICULTY
In the decade preceding the PLRA, many federal judges became managers of systemic prison reforms and thus oversaw directly, or through special masters, the day-to-day operations of 21 correctional institutions. In some instances, a federal district judge effectively took control of a state's entire prison system.2 5 Feeley and Rubin characterized "the massive intervention into state corrections . . . [as] the most striking example of judicial policy making" in modern America.
Moreover, they concluded that judicially engineered prison reform "violated nearly every accepted principle for controlling the judicial branch."
This manner of prison reform directly confronted what Bickel famously called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" 2s -that democracy means majority rule and the power of the 24 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376, 376-77 (1982) (describing a "more active, 'managerial' stance" among judges, leading them to "meet[] with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation"); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 REV. , 1284 REV. (1976 (defining the role of the trial judge as "the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief"); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979) (defining the role of the trial judge as a "political powerbroker"); cf Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 790-853 (1978) (providing a generic, in-depth description of institutional reform adjudication). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinay in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467 (1980) (contending that institutional reform adjudication had much in common with traditional litigation but for the "undreamed-of entitlements" it dispensed) (footnote omitted).
5 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 , 1297 -402 (S.D. Tex. 1980 ), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981 , modified, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (ordering system-wide relief in Texas); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 289-90 286 (5th Cir. 1977 ), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978 (ordering system-wide relief in Alabama); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 986-89 (D.R.I. 1977 ), remanded to 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979 ), affd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1979 ) (ordering system-wide relief in Puerto Rico); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 382-85 E.D. Ark. 1970 ), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971 federal judiciary to impede majority rule renders judicial review a "deviant institution."2 Majoritarians posit a distinction between law and policy; they envisage a minimal, deferential role for the courts, with judges reading the open-ended provisions of the Constitution in light of majority opinion and the policy preferences of the elected branches of government.
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The Framers of the Constitution did not share Bickel's concerns. They distrusted majority rule" and embraced natural rights. Their notion of democracy rested on the Lockean individual rather than the collective good.
2 "To Locke," wrote one 29 Id. at 27. The pervasive suspicion of judicial review finds expression in what is perhaps the most important contribution to constitutional scholarship of the past fifty years, John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust. In one revealing passage, Ely seamlessly quotes Bickel and, in so doing, bows to the majoritarian paradigm:
[M]ost of the important policy decisions are made by our elected representatives (or by people accountable to them) .... Judges, at least federal judges-while they obviously are not entirely oblivious to popular opinion -are not elected or reelected. "[Nlothing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial review works counter to this characteristic." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1982) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 18, at 19).
" See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) 
35
Court began consistently to uphold New Deal legislation.
The elevation of Felix Frankfurter from New Deal adviser to Associate Justice symbolized the constitutional dominance of majoritarianism in the post-1937 constitutional order. 36 He spoke on behalf of majoritarian supremacy when he announced from the bench that "[c]ourts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflection of a democratic society . . . .We are to set aside the judgment of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it .... Law could be purposive but only at the majority's behest. suit ofJustice, 44 S.D. L. REV. 466, 468 (1999) ("[T] o the Framers of the Constitution, democracy was a negative-the right to be free from government interference in certain respects.") (footnote omitted). Deference became the "central principle of judicial review" in the post-Lochner era. 38 When paired with the rational-basis test, 9 deference stood for the formal separation of law and policy; and when law and policy met in the real world, deference meant that functionaries of the emerging administrative state would not be second-guessed on their policy choices and factual assessments.
Well into the past century, courts themselves preempted judicial oversight of prisons by their adherence to the hands-off doctrine.
It represented an early, extreme form of judicial deference by questioning the competence of courts to grasp prison administration, 4 ' warning that judicial meddling would embolden inmates to disrespect and disobey their keepers, 42 and 38 See Solove, supra note 35, at 949. Solove defined the "deference principle" as follows: "that the Court should not attempt to 'second-guess' or 'substitute' its judgment for the judgment of another decisionmaker or to pass on the 'wisdom' of a policy or law." Id. at 943.
3' SeeBarels v. Iowa, 255 U.S. 407, 412 (1921) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (internal citation omitted) ("[T]he only criterion of ... liberty under the Constitution that I can think of is 'whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat."'). Deference to the elected branches of government formed the keystone ofJustice Holmes' approach to judicial restraint:
For a Holmesian, it is up to the legislature and executive to respond to social change and "the felt necessities of the times," not the courts. Reflecting this fact, virtually all Holmesian references to a notion of evolving concepts in the Constitution occur in the context of deference to governmental decision.
R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal
History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 199 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
'0 See, e.g., United States ex rel Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1956 ) (declaring that "it is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1950) (positing that it "is not within the province of the courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there"); United States ex rel Palmer v. Ragen 159 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1947 ) (observing that " [u] nder repeated decisions, state governmental bodies, who are charged with prosecution and punishment of offenders, are not to be interfered with except in case of extraordinary circumstances") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
" See, e.g 
., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 18 (1973) ("The courts refused for the most part to intervene.
Judges felt that correctional administration was a technical matter to be left to experts ... ").
" ' See, e.g An ever-rising tide of prisoner lawsuits followed; 4 and the judiciary commenced a transformation "perhaps second in breadth and detail only to the courts' earlier role in dismantling segregation in the nation's public schools." 6 While the lower federal courts powered this exercise in judicial policy making, 7 the Supreme Court tried to break its speed. Just ten years after the collapse of the hands-off doctrine, the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish" called for post-Lochner deference. 9 The Bell Court indicated that restrichad to consider his possible tort liabilities it might unduly limit his actions"); Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960 ) (concluding that "to allow such actions would be prejudicial to the proper maintenance of discipline").
" See, e.g (lamenting that the hands-off doctrine permitted "conditions of squalor and inhumane treatment by correctional personnel and had nowhere to turn for help"); KENNETHJ. PEAK, JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 218 (2d ed. 1998) (observing that "conditions in many prisons were almost insufferable for both staff members and inmates"); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967) (declaring that " [l] ife in many institutions is at best barren and futile, at worst unspeakably brutal and degrading"); MICHAEL WELCH: CORRECTIONS: A CRITICAL APPROACH 356 (1996) (observing that the hands-off doctrine allowed correctional officials "to operate prisons and jails free from constraints, even if physical abuse of prisoners was employed to instill discipline and horrific living conditions persisted in the prison"). tions on inmates would survive constitutional challenge merely by being "reasonably related to the government's interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion. 5° Moreover, in determining reasonableness,judges should defer to prison staff:
[C]ourts must heed our warning that "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of correctional officials, and in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters." 5 1
Notwithstanding pronouncements of a "new" hands-off doctrine emerging from the Court, 2 Bell did not prevent institutional reform decrees. 5 Indeed, their breadth more than Outsiders'-from denials of equal concern and respect").
As I employ the term, "outsiders" are persons whose character has been so discredited that their identities have been "spoiled" and thus denied "respect and regard" by the community. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 8-9 (1963). Consequently, they are no longer "like us"-in other words, "outsiders." As I have written elsewhere, "Outsiders find themselves highly vulnerable to hardships bred by their civic impoverishment, which include indifference, neglect, or capriciousness." Robertson, supra at 484. Imprisonment almost invariably imposes "outsider" membership:
First, the loss of liberty embodies physical removal from the broader community and, symbolically, "represents a deliberate, moral rejection of the criminal by the free community." In turn, the rules regulating virtually every aspect of daily life deprive one of autonomy and thus threaten "the prisoner's self-image as a fully accredited member of adult society."
Id. at 484-85(footnotes omitted) (quoting GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVEs 65, 76 (1958)).
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the "scant deliberation" given the PLRA).
60 Throughout the Congressional Record, Senators Dole Hatch, Kyl, and Reid denigrated the legitimacy of inmate litigation by anecdotal accounts of seemingly outlandish suits. They retold some alleged abuses, such as an inmate suing over a bad haircut, again and again. See, e.g Can the majoritarian paradigm adequately protect powerless, stigmatized groups? 6 3 Some of their number, such as African-Americans, are largely identified and defined by physiological attributes. Other groups, including inmates, are socially constructed.
The most influential attempt at reconciling their protection with majoritarianism came at the height of the New Deal in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 6 4 The facts of Carolene Products do not bear repeating because the decision is synonymous JudgeJon 0. Newman found that some of the more highly publicized examples of frivolous litigation "were at best highly misleading and, sometimes, simply false." Hon. John 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOKLYN L. REv. 519, 520-27 (1996) . The number of truly frivolous inmate suits amounted to "needles" in "the 'haystacks' of prisoner lawsuits." Id. at 52. Two other studies reached similar conclusions. After examining filings in Arkansas, Illinois, and Missouri, Howard Eisenberg concluded that an inmate's notion of "some arbitrary, irrational, bureaucratic, or dehumanizing" aspect of confinement might appear to a court as frivolous. Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 438. "What to most people would be a very insignificant manner becomes, because of he nature of prison life, a matter of real concern to the inmate." Id. at 438-39. In his study of California filings, Theodore Eisenberg deduced that "most prisoner section 1983 complaints were not plainly trivial assertions ....
Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and An Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 537 (1982 REv. 963, 963 (1994) ("The central problem of democratic government is protecting minorities form the tyranny of the majority. In drafting the Constitution, the Framers were sensitive to this concern ..... ' 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) .
with its famous footnote four. 65 It provided for "more searching" or "more exacting" judicial scrutiny when legislation (1) endangered specific textual rights; (2) interfered with democratic processes; or (3) evidenced prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities."6 Footnote four has become the basis for "tiered" scrutiny of legislation, with statutory burdens on fundamental rights or suspect classes6 receiving enhanced ju- There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment ....
It is unnecessary to consider whether legislation which restricts these political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment .... Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations into the review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a specific condition, which tends seriously to curtail and operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry.
" Fundamental rights are those liberties "so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates fundamental rights, thus making them applicable to the states. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding that the right against double jeopardy is fundamental); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (holding that the right to travel is fundamental); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by jury is fundamental); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel is fundamental). See generally U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting, in relevant part, states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
68 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (ruling that legislation preventing aliens from receiving welfare benefits contravenes the Equal Protection Clause); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that school segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause). The burden falls upon the government to dicial scrutiny. Strict scrutiny usually invalidates the legislation in question. 69 On the other hand, non-suspect legislative classifications must merely be rational 7° and enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality."
Lower federal courts have uniformly rejected heightened protection for inmates. Boivin v. Black 5 aptly illustrates their perfunctory treatment of this issue: the First Circuit dispensed of the plaintiffs claim to being a member of a suspect class by the glib rejoinder "[w]e need not linger long over . . . [the inmate-plaintiff's] suggestion." 74 Nonetheless, Congress enacted the PLRA in the face of flagrant wrongs inflicted on inmates. 7 5 An informal sampling yields the following: confining an inmate for twenty-three hours a day in a windowless, unlit cell frequently awash with sewage; [A]nyone who reads the evidence accrued in the hundreds of lawsuits brought to the courts by state prisoners in the past few years can only conclude that all too many Ameican prisons-perhaps the majority-are depressing, rat-infested, heavily overcrowded fortresses that have created perverse societies in which violence, homosexual rape, and other assorted cruelties are everyday occurrences.
Since the above observation, we have entered a new century to no avail; the state of our prisons remains perilous. The sad tale of Texas' prisons is a case-in-point:
The evidence before this court revealed a prison underworld in which rapes, beatings, and servitude are the currency of power. Inmates who refuse to join race-based gangs may be physically or sexually assaulted. To preserve their physical safety, some vulnerable inmates simply subject to being bought and sold among groups of prison predators, providing their oppressors with commissary goods, domestic services, or sexual favors. The lucky ones are allowed to pay money for their protection. Other abused inmates find that violating prison rules, so that they may be locked away in single cells in administrative segregation, is a rational means of self-protection, despite the loss of good time that comes with their "punishment." To expect such a world to rehabilitate wrongdoers is absurd. To allow such a world to exist is unconstitutional.
Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 916 (S.D. Tex. 1999) .
7 " See McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991) . 77 Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 1996) . 78 Bogan v. Stround, 958 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1992) .
" See Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993) . '0 SeeFruitv. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147 , 1148 -49 (8th Cir. 1990 ).
Why do these abuses occur in the face of scrutinizing courts and more than three decades of judicially engineered reforms? 8 First, prisons remain "closed institutions 8 2 that confine inmates as well as inhibit outside scrutiny. Second, to many people, inmates are unworthy of concern. Finally, their disenfranchisement, s ' poverty, ss and pariah status s6 render them powerless before the elected branches of government.
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Several commentators favor extending suspect status to inmates. Professor Karlan spoke of inmates as ". . . the least sympathetic group of 'outsiders' in our constitutional jurisprudence."
Similarly, Professor Chemerinsky asserted, "There are other discrete and insular minorities. I believe that prisoners, for example, will get no protection from the political process. They have no political constituency. The only way to protect prisoners from inhumane treatment is the federal judi- Section 1983 Suits in Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 639 (1979 REV. 686, 695-96 (1991) (commenting that "the reference [in footnote four] to 'discrete and insular minority' [in the third paragraph of footnote four] may refer to groups other than blacks and religious and national-origin minorities," adding the "lack of political power may justify heightened judicial solicitude for other groups in the future.").
'0 Riewe, supra note 17, at 143. " Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 732 (1985) ; see also ELY, supra note 29, at 147 (stating that race is "the clearest case of a classification that should count as suspect.").
92 Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, supra note 17, at 124-40 (describing inmates as a largely black subgroup that experiences racial segregation, prejudice, disenfranchisement, and impoverishment); see also, e.g., SMTH, supra note 87, at 288 ("Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a despised minority without political power to influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.").
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) . Id. at 557 (1984) (StevensJ, dissenting). 99 ERVINGGOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 6 (1961): The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the barriers separating three spheres of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member's activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases varying degrees of mental illness.
" Already damaged, 99 many inmates experience imprisonment as ". . . a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self."' 0 0 Not surprisingly, many will leave prison further damaged, with their "outsider" status more deeply engrained. Many will return. 1 ' "[Wie are producing prisoners," concluded James Austin andJohn Irwin, "who have deteriorated in prison and return to the outside much less well-equipped to live a conventional life than they were when they entered prison." 02 In exchange, the public accrues few if any benefits: "The universal wisdom is that our prisons have fallen woefully short in achieving their objectives-community protection, crime reduction, and offender rehabilitation. "10 3 Several lower federal courts have read the Eighth Amendment to forbid prison conditions that foster recidivism' and of the day's activities are tightly scheduled. Finally, the various enforced activity are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official objectives of the institution. Confinement, 48 SMU L. REv. 373, 374 (1995) .
'a4 See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977) ; Hendrix v. Faulkner, 527 F. Supp. 435, 525 (N.D. Ind. 1981) ; Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 131-32 (D. Colo. 1979 ), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1980 ; Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 consequent reimprisonment. At the apex of this case law stands Laaman v. Helgemoe.' 0 5 It ruled that confinement in a New Hampshire prison inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by ".... cost[ing] a man more than part of his life; it robs him of his skills, his ability to cope with society in a civilized manner, and most importantly, his essential human dignity." '° Justices Brennan and Blackmun later adopted Laaman's concept of cruel and usual punishment. In his concurring opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman,'° Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote: "When 'the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration,' the court must conclude that the conditions violate the Constitution." 08 By asserting a crimineogenic relationship between the prison and the neighborhoods that channel young men into its walls, 1° this concept of the Eighth Amendment parts with tradi-
